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Article 2

Ison: Analysis of Runway Incursion Trends

Runway incursions, defined as an occurrence in which a vehicle, aircraft, or
person makes an unauthorized transgression onto a runway, have been a focus of
aviation safety stakeholders due to their potential for substantial loss of life in the
event of a collision. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, n.d.) has
long advocated for incursion mitigation in the form of technology, training, and
research. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has implemented mandatory
reporting of incursions and tracks such events in its Runway Incursion Database
(RWS) (FAA, 2017). Additionally, the FAA has invested a substantial amount of
resources into runway incursion mitigation strategies, for example, improving
airport signage and markings, increasing pilot education outreach, and the
installation of various technologies to improve situational awareness and aircraft
position monitoring (FAA, 2007; 2017). The implemented technologies include
Airport Surface Detection Equipment – Model X (ASDE-X) and Runway Status
Lights (RWSL) systems (FAA, 2007; Office of the Inspector General – Department
of Transportation [OIGDOT], 2018).
As can be expected, these improvements come at a high cost. According to
the OIGDOT (2018), from 2005 through 2011, the total cost of the ASDE program
was $549.8 million, with unexpected overages accounting for approximately $100
million of the total expenditures. While the total spent on RWSL was not readily
available within the literature, historical costs can provide an estimate. In 2014, the
allotment for RWSL was $35.2 million, in 2015 it was $41.7 million, and in 2016
it was $22.6 million with an additional $1.57 million for sustainment costs. Thus
the total cost over this three-year period was over $101 million (FAA, 2016).
Considering the RWSL program has been in development since 2004, the total cost,
at what appears to average $33 million per annum, is likely to be significant
(Kuffner & Perkins, 2009). The problem is that the effectiveness of these
investments has not been substantially empirically analyzed thus, little is known
about the costs versus benefits of the various implemented improvements (Kuffner
& Perkins, 2009; Schönefeld & Möller, 2012; Van Eekeren, Wright, and Čokorilo,
2018).
Literature Review
Defining Runway Incursions
According to the FAA, runway incursions are defined as “any occurrence
at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person
on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and takeoff of aircraft”
(FAA, 2008, p. 37). This definition was adopted from the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) to better align with international aviation safety
standardization in 2008 (FAA, 2008). The ICAO and the FAA categorize the
severity of incursions as:
• Category A: A serious incident in which a collision was narrowly avoided
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•

Category B: An incident in which separation decreases and there is a
significant potential for collision, which may result in a time-critical
corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision
• Category C: An incident characterized by ample time and/or distance to
avoid a collision
• Category D: Incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as
the incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected
area of a surface designated for the landing and takeoff of aircraft but with
no immediate safety consequences (FAA, 2017).
The FAA (2017) further delineates that category A and B incursions are “serious”
(p. 43) versus category C and D, which are generally considered lower risk. The
amendment to the definition of runway incursions in 2008 resulted in a substantial
jump in category C and D events and should be noted as a result of this change
rather than a “real” dramatic boost in such occurrences (FAA, 2008; 2017).
Trends in and Responses to Runway Incursions
Considering forecasted rises in global air traffic, runway incursions will
continue to be a substantial concern for aviation safety. Mrazova (2014) explained
that runway safety is of particular concern due to traffic growth, with runway
incursions set to rise along with traffic if interventions are not adopted. Depending
on the airport, it is estimated that a 20% increase in traffic volume may increase the
potential for single runway incursion rates by up to 140% (Schönefeld & Möller,
2012). To assist in mitigating such threats to safety, sufficient investment in proven
improvement strategies were noted to be essential to mitigating safety threats such
as incursion (Chen, Zhang, & Chen, 2016). Morrison and Winston (2008) described
FAA expenditures for air traffic system improvement, noting that “given the
expected growth in air travel, it is incumbent on the FAA to make efficient use of
its preferred mechanism – public spending… Its failure to do so will compound the
inefficiencies” (p. 670). The question also remains if such investments are effective
in reaching desired outcomes: “surprisingly, little effort has been made to assess
the efficacy of FAA’s expenditures” (Morrison & Winston, 2008, p. 670).
Reinforcing the responsible use of money to fix aviation system problems,
especially in safety, Hong-bing and Qing-qing (2015) stated that “inadequate safety
investment could affect safety level, and yet misallocation of investment would
result in a waste of resources… Thus it’s of great significance to properly grasp the
safety investment direction, and allocate reasonably the ratio to each aspect” (p.
780). Van Eekeren, Wright, and Čokorilo (2018) further stated that “the law of
diminishing return, however, might pose future financially motivated restrictions.
Therefore cost-effective runway risk-mitigations are necessary” (p. 261).
One relatively simple safety enhancement that was outlined in this study is
the airport “hot spot.” These are locations on airports that have commonly been
involved with runway incursions or have characteristics attributable to higher
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incursion probabilities such as complex taxiway and runway intersection geometry.
Hot spots are made known to pilots via circles highlighting the problem locations
on airport diagrams (Schönfeld & Möller, 2102). Though there has not been formal
research on the effectiveness of hot spots, the relatively low cost of the intervention
and its ability to potentially increase pilot situational awareness are laudable
(Mrazova, 2014).
Mrazova (2014) presented counts of the various types of incursions,
including annual totals for the years 2009-2014. While the number of incursions
peaked between 2012 and 2013, Mzazova (2014) stated that “we can see decreasing
rate[s] of runway incursion[s] in 2014 compared to 2013” (p. 73). Two prominent
considerations about this observation are that the numbers presented were counts
of incursions, not rates of incursion (e.g., per 1,000,000 operations), and it is
difficult to determine real trends over just one year. Further, the 2014 total number
of incursions exceeded the totals for years 2009-2011.
Schönefeld and Möller (2012) also illustrated that general aviation (GA)
was the primary causal category of operations among runway incursions. The
authors see this as problematic as “technical and financial constraints for most of
the general aviation aircraft and smaller airports limit the use of runway incursion
prevention technology” (Schönefeld & Möller, 2012, p. 33). In essence, since the
improvements offered by the FAA and European agencies focus on large,
commercial airports with minimal GA traffic, the impact of incursion prevention
systems may not be focused on the most suitable venues. Further, since GA
operations involve less-experienced pilots with less sophisticated technologies, the
systems may not have the expected influence (Schönefeld & Möller, 2012).
RWSL at Los Angeles International and Dallas-Fort Worth International
Airports
In order to address incursion concerns, two airports, Dallas-Fort Worth
International (DFW) and Los Angeles International (LAX), were selected for
RWSL prototype testing in 2003 and 2009, respectively. The system at LAX was
considered operational in 2013 and 2005 for DFW (FAA, 2008). LAX was selected
because “according to the Federal Aviation Administration, an earlier installation
of lights greatly reduced the number of runway incursions at LAX, which had the
most runway safety violations in the nation from 1999 to 2007” (Weikel, 2012,
para. 2). According to FAA databases, from 1997-2007 LAX had six category A
incursions and thirteen category B types (FAA, 2017b; 2001). DFW was selected
due to high traffic volumes and having complicated airport layout (Russell, 2017).
From 1997-2007, DFW had two category A events and four category B events
(FAA, 2017b; 2001). The logic of significant investment to install incursion
mitigation technologies at airports as large as LAX and DFW coupled with low
general aviation traffic at both locations is perplexing, especially in light of
comparisons with other potential candidate airports (Hong-bing & Qing-qing,
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2015). A few examples of airports with notably higher incursion rates than those of
LAX and DFW from 1999-2007 are outlined in Table 1.
Cost-Benefit Analysis in Aviation Safety
As is the case with any project that requires public funds to assist in their
development, runway incursion mitigation is subject to accountability standards of
the OIGDOT (2008; 2018). Cost-benefit analysis of improvements is generally
considered part of the analysis necessary to determine the allocation of finite
resources to improve safety. As noted by Van Eekeren et al. (2018), “cost-effective
runway risk mitigations are necessary” (p. 261) as an infinite source of funding for
safety enhancements is not available. The authors estimated the total worldwide
cost of runway accidents between 2015 and 2018 to be $20 billion. Although the
calculation of the cost of an aviation accident is exceptionally complex, Ferdman
(2014) calculated that a single aviation accident involving one large commercial
transport aircraft could have a total liability of $1 billion.
As noted previously, Van Eekeren et al. (2018) highlighted that general
aviation is involved in “by far the highest number of runway events” (p. 264). In
terms of cost-benefit analysis, apparently the investment in groups that may achieve
the highest benefit should be targeted, thus it would make sense to invest in airports
with the highest rates of incursions particularly where general aviation activity
interacts with commercial aviation on a regular basis (FAA, 1998; Rogerson,
Lambert, & Johns, 2013).
Rogerson et al. (2013) described a framework for program effectiveness
analysis using layers of stakeholder and expert risk acceptance to determine if a
project is not warranted, possibly, warranted, or warranted based upon the rate of
incursions per 100,000 operations. In an example analysis, the study outlined the
presumption of the need for incursion mitigation at certain airports based on the
presence of a flight school. Out of fifteen airports, only seven met the threshold for
warranted, two for possibly warranted, and four not warranted. An additional
analysis of 29 airports showed that only two qualified for warranted intervention,
sixteen for possibly warranted, and eleven for unwarranted. While many of the
assumptions of the outlined model were theoretical, the study did indicate
considerations for selective implementation of interventions with finite resources.
Again, targeting problem populations (e.g., user groups and specific airports) being
highlighted as key to the success of safety enhancement improvements.
Along similar lines, Stewart and Mueller (2013) found that looking for a
break-even cost-benefit ratio decreases the likelihood of a safety-related event but
does not waste resources. They noted that this approach is increasingly being used
in aviation thus it lends itself to aviation problems, in this specific case to terrorism
prevention, though, as noted by the authors, it could be more widely applicable to
aviation safety problems (Stewart & Mueller, 2013).
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Chen et al. (2016) also found that some of the highest returns on investments
were in the areas of training and technology. Hong-bing and Qing-qing (2015) came
to similar conclusions, noting that in order to maximize safety improvements,
investments should be focused specifically on projects that have the most
significant impact. The authors stated that productive safety investment was a
function of the rate of safety improvement in contrast to total costs moreover, both
direct and indirect costs and benefits should be considered. The study also showed
that there is a point at which safety investment peaks regarding improvements, thus
further investment may result in diminishing returns. Therefore, there is a balance
to investment where too much can be a waste while not enough may not have
sufficient impact.
An empirical framework for evaluating FAA investments in aviation system
enhancements was developed by Morrison and Winston (2008) in response to the
inadequate assessment of the efficacy of such investments. In alignment with other
researchers, Morrison and Winston (2008) indicated that the proper balance of
investment must be made as improper allocation could have negative impacts on
safety. At the same time, it was noted that there had been an inadequate assurance
that spending has been conducted most efficiently. Lastly, the authors stated that as
is often the case in aviation, arbitrary and reactionary responses often dictate
priorities of investment without empirical and more in-depth inquiry into the
efficacy and value of these outlays (Morrison & Winston, 2008).
In 2008, the Principal Assistant Inspector General for Auditing and
Evaluation stated that RWSL is a “viable technology” (OIGDOT, 2008, p. 7) for
runway incursion prevention. Relying on data collected at Dallas-Ft. Worth
International Airport between October 2002 and February 2005, there was a 70%
decrease in incursions. As such, it was recommended that the FAA expedite the
installation of RWSL at other locations. No considerations about cost and statistical
verification of system impact were mentioned. Further, the author stated that “we
did not rely on information contained in databases [sic] maintained by the Agency
as part of this review. Therefore, we did not conduct a data reliability assessment”
(OIGDOT, 2008, p. 15). This statement highlights the need to conduct empiricallybased research on the effectiveness of such investments.
Method
The purpose of this quantitative, correlational and causal-comparative
study was to evaluate the impact of RWSL installation at LAX and DFW airports.
Insight into the costs versus benefits of these installations was also explored.
Sampling Procedures
OPSNET data was collected for Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport
(DFW) and Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) as these airports were early
adopters of various runway safety improvements such as RWSL. Data was
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collected for the years 2001-2017 (2018 data was incomplete at the time of this
study). Rates of incursions were calculated by dividing the total number of
incursions by total airport tower operations (FAA, 2017).
Measures
Data from OPSNET was downloaded as comma-separated values (CSV)
files and imported into Excel for initial data analysis including the calculation of
rates and counts. From the resulting Excel worksheets, data was uploaded to SPSS
for the calculation of Chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests. Excel was also used
to produce graphs of counts and rates.
Research Design
The designs used in the study were correlational and causal-comparative.
Spearman correlations were used to investigate the relationship of incursion rates
with passage of time. Chi-square tests were utilized to assess associations and
potential differences among observed and expected counts of incursions before and
after RWSL installation at LAX and DFW airports. In cases of low incursion counts
in which Chi-square and Fisher’s Exact tests were not recommended, binomial tests
were conducted (Field, 2013). Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to identify
differences, if any, among incursion rates for the periods before and after the
installations of RWSL at LAX and DFW airports.
Results
Statistical and Data Analysis
Incursions: LAX and DFW airport trends and differences. Counts of
incursions during 2001-2012 at LAX were compared to counts for 2013-2017, and
for DFW, the ranges were 2001-2004 versus 2005-2017. These ranges were based
upon when the RWSL was considered operational at each airport. Due to low
counts for A and B severity incursions, these were combined for each airport and
were analyzed using a two-tailed binomial test. The proportion of A and B
incursions occurring at LAX before RWSL of .86 (n = 6) was not significantly
different than the expected .697, p = 0.646 while the proportion after RWSL was
operational of .303 (n = 1) was not significantly different than the expected .14, p
= 0.646. For DFW, the proportion of A and B incursions occurring before RWSL
of 0.00 (n = 0) was not significantly different than the expected .267, p = 1.00 while
the proportion after RWSL was operational of 1.00 (n = 2) was not significantly
different than the expected .733, p = 1.00. Chi-square goodness-of-fit tests were
used for analyzing C and D incursions for the periods before and after RWSL being
completely operational at each airport (see Tables 2 and 3). Mann-Whitney U tests
were also conducted for each airport and severity category rate comparing the
apposite years (see Table 4). Graphs of counts and rates for LAX and DFW airports,
with trend lines, are provided in Figures 1 through 4.
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Discussion
Combined category A and B counts using two-tailed binomial tests did not
indicate any significant changes from the periods before and after RWSL systems
were considered to be operational. The low counts of A and B category incursions
at both airports is notable in and of itself, as these were selected as critical airports
at which to implement the systems. In fairness, before 2001, LAX did have some
severe events, including a collision between two aircraft on a runway in nighttime
conditions. However, overall data subsequent period after that event does not seem
to support the emphatic nature of the impetus of expensive interventions. The low
number of occurrences at DFW airport also calls into question the selection of such
a large airport, requiring significant investment, to implement RWSL. In the cases
of both LAX and DFW airports, there does not appear to be a significant change
since the implementation of RWSL. Chi-square analyses of category C incursions
for both LAX and DFW indicated significant increases in counts from those that
would be expected based on traffic levels, yet for category D neither airport had
significant differences.
Mann Whitney U tests conducted on incursion rates indicated that there
were no differences for category A, B, and D events when comparing periods before
and after RWSL operational status. Category C events, however, did show
significant increases between periods. Both sets of tests do not support initial claims
by the literature that the potential impact of RWSL to reduce runways incursions
by 70 to 80% cannot be verified in the scope of this study.
Analysis of LAX airport data indicated that both C and D category incursion
counts and rates have been increasing. There were not enough A and B category
events to provide a palpable trajectory (Figures 1 and 2). The only trendline with a
good fit was for rates of C incursions (R2 = 0.8439). For DFW, there were no
category B events, and there was no clear trend for A events. Category C events
showed a clear upward trend with a large amount of yearly variation (R2 = 0.6571),
while Category D had a negligible upward slope, with very low congruity (Figures
3 and 4). Both airports have seen total incursions increasing over time due to a rise
in category C and D occurrences. For DFW, in particular, there was a noticeable
jump in the C severity category following the adoption of the FAA’s new incursion
definition in 2008.
Conclusion
Considering these findings, it is evident that the data do not seem to support
the claims of a significant reduction in incursions as outlined in the literature. Also,
as both LAX and DFW are sizeable airports and have minimal general aviation
operations, the combination of significant pavement infrastructures and ensuing
construction costs coupled with a low to the non-existent population of aviation
operations which are most responsible for incursions, calls into question the
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selection of these airports for investment for RWSL. In the current constrained
government funding environment, investment in the least expensive intervention
with the most impact is not only fiscally responsible but necessary in light of
dwindling, scarce resources. It possible that the implementation of RWSL,
particularly at LAX and DFW may have been rushed without a detailed statistical
analysis of the realistic impact the system had during testing. Also, a candid and
precise cost-benefit analysis would logically have been a pre-requisite before
implementation. As previously outlined, there seems to have been a significant
investment in RWSL in an environment that does not have a significant need for it.
The impact of RWSL on LAX and DFW airports does not appear to align
with expectations based on the literature. When comparing periods before RWSL
became active with those after implementation, no significant changes were noted
in counts of A, B, and D events. Rates for A, B, and C also did not significantly
differ. Graphical data appears to support these findings. This effort helps to ensure
that large investments of public funds are spent on the solutions that provide the
most benefit at the lowest cost being applied at the appropriate locations. The
findings of this study advocate for further research on incursion trends and costeffective mitigation strategies targeted toward airports with substantial general
aviation operations.
Suggestions for Future Research
Based on the findings within this study, the following suggestions for
future research are provided:
• Regular monitoring and analysis of runway incursion trends utilizing
statistical analysis
• Empirical study of cost-benefit ratios of FAA investments, particularly
when requiring substantial resources from stakeholders and the tax-payer
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Appendix A
Tables

Table 1
Average Incursion Rates for Select Airports (1999-2007)
Airport
Average Incursion Rate
Los Angeles International (LAX)
1.189
Dallas-Ft. Worth International (DFW)
0.741
Ft. Lauderdale Executive (FXE)
2.475
North Las Vegas (VGT)
3.530
Palm Springs (PSP)
2.336
Table 2
Chi Square Goodness-of-fit: C Counts for LAX and DFW Airports
Years

N

DF

Chi-Sqa

ϕ

LAX 2001-2012 v.
148
1
72.66
0.4909
2013-2017
DFW 2001-2004 v.
103
1
24.01
0.2331
2005-2017
Notes: Effect size is ϕ. adenotes continuity correction was applied.

P-Value

Direction
of Δ

<0.001
<0.001

Table 3
Chi Square Goodness-of-fit: D Counts for LAX and DFW Airports
Years

N

DF

Chi-Sqa

ϕ

LAX 2001-2012 v.
94
1
1.82
0.0193
2013-2017
DFW 2001-2004 v.
51
1
0.97
0.0190
2005-2017
Notes: Effect size is ϕ. adenotes continuity correction was applied.
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Table 4
Mann-Whitney U Tests for A, B, C, and D rates – LAX and DFW Airports
Years

A rate U, r,
& p-value

B rate U, r,
& p-value

C rate U, r,
& p-value

LAX 2001-2012 v. 2013-2017

27.5, 0.156,
0.519

28.0, 0.07,
0.879

3.0, 0.69,
0.004*

DFW 2001-2004 v. 2005-2017

22.0, 0.196,
0.419

26.0, 0, 1.0

8.0, 0.495,
0.041*

D rate
U, r, &
p-value
22.0,
0.204,
0.399
15.0,
0.302,
0.245

Notes: r is effect size. *denotes p < 0.05.
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Appendix B
Figures

Figure 1. LAX Airport A, B, C, & D severity counts of incursions 2001-2017
with linear trendlines. Note: trendlines for A & B were negligible.
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Figure 2. LAX Airport A, B, C, & D severity rates of incursions 2001-2017 with
linear trendlines. Notes: trendlines for A & B were negligible. R2 C rate = 0.8439; D rate =
0.1388.
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Figure 3. DFW Airport A, B, C, & D severity rates of incursions 2001-2017 with
linear trendlines. Notes: trendline for A was negligible; there were no B events.
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Figure 4. DFW Airport A, B, C, & D severity rates of incursions 2001-2017 with
linear trendlines. Notes: trendline for A was negligible; there were no B events. R2 C rate =
0.6571; D rate = 0.0109.
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